After 2001, September 11th was no longer just another date in the Gregorian calendar. The hijackings, and eventual crashes, of four commercial airplanes saw the loss of 3,000 lives and the synonymous imagery of this event will forever be the flow of thick, black smoke billowing from the two tallest structures in the world.

Shortly afterwards on October 7th 2001, having identified Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden as the main perpetrator of these attacks, then-US President George W. Bush invaded Afghanistan with the support of British forces and the Afghan Northern Alliance. Eight years since that day, and thousands of lives later, the ‘War on Terror’ is still being questioned on both moral and strategic grounds. But the relevancy of the moral issue, of whether it was even right to invade Afghanistan in the first place, is now far surpassed by the importance of the strategic question, which is essentially what lies ahead for both this war-torn nation and for the armed forces who continue to maintain their presence there.

The war in Afghanistan is now considered to be the main battleground in the fight against terrorism and US President Barack Obama has acknowledged this by increasing the troop level from 36,000 to 53,000. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is sending an additional 200 IED (improvised explosive device) specialists to support the 9,000 British troops currently in Afghanistan and has more than doubled the amount of spending to support each soldier, from £180,000 to £390,000. In a recent speech, Mr Brown outlined his counter insurgency strategy; which was to strengthen the Afghan police force and partner, rather than mentor, the Afghan troops. The idea at the core of this strategy is to empower both the civilian and military Afghani forces to take greater responsibility across the country. Indeed Mr Brown went on to say “The more Afghans [who] can take responsibility in the short term, the less our coalition forces will be needed in the longer term.” The aim of the occupying forces is to help increase the size of the Afghan army to 134,000, from its current level of 90,000. This goal is expected to be reached in November 2011, having already been brought forward from 2014.

The consequences of this are evident; the sooner the Afghan army expands, the sooner all combat troops can return home. Whilst the British political landscape, with a general election just six months away, has made it difficult for Mr Brown to commit even more troops, Barack Obama’s election promise to commit more troops to Afghanistan means that the US will need to take the lead role in both the counter insurgency effort and the gradual handover of power to Afghan forces. This has been echoed by the British Ambassador to Kabul, Mark Sedwill, who said he hoped Afghan forces would be in charge of security by the time of the next Afghan general election in 2014.

Whilst all sides will continue to experience the unfortunate certainty of war that is sustaining casualities, on paper at least Mr Brown does seem to have the right strategy. However in practice, especially following recent complaints of equipment shortages, Brown’s strategy remains a questionable one, and therefore only time will tell whether this ‘War on Terror’ can conclude successfully.

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